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Promoting Justice Across Borders* 
Lucia M. Rafanelli 
 
Political theorists have written a great deal about the ethics of “intervention,” defined as 
states using coercion or force to interfere in foreign societies’ politics (e.g., Caney, 2005: 227; 
Doyle, 2015: 2-5; Fabre, 2012; Tesón and van der Vossen, 2017; Walzer, 2015; Weiss, 2016: 7; 
Welsh, 2004: 3). But this work leaves much of global politics un-analyzed—both because non-
state actors play an increasingly significant role in it (Falk, 2016) and because its practitioners 
use many tactics besides force and coercion. We need an ethics of foreign influence that can help 
us navigate the global political arena—alive with myriad state and non-state actors trading 
influence in every way imaginable—in all its complexity.  
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Recently, some have begun to address this need. Though admirable, their work is 
narrowly-focused in its own ways. Some transcends the literature’s usual focus on coercion to 
discuss the ethics of non-coercive foreign influence, but remains narrowly-focused on state 
activity (e.g., Fabre, 2018; Pattison, 2018). Some discusses non-state actors, but focuses only on 
foreign influence meant to alleviate extraordinarily grave injustices (e.g., Bellamy, 2018; Fabre, 
2018a; Pattison, 2018a). Similarly, Rubenstein’s (2015) insightful treatment of the ethical issues 
faced by humanitarian international NGOs (INGOs) is so specifically tailored to the distinctive 
features unique to these organizations that its findings can’t be generalized to other kinds of 
actors exerting influence on the global stage. Rubenstein (2015: 3) herself suggests as much 
when she writes that the ethical challenges INGOs face are “built into their very structure as 
organizations,” and when she presents her ethical conclusions as designed particularly for a 
“distinctive type of political actor”—“large-scale, Western-based, donor-funded humanitarian 
INGOs”. 
This article, in contrast, begins to develop a unified theory of the ethics of deliberate 
attempts to promote justice in foreign societies—no matter what kind of political actor makes 
these attempts, and no matter the gravity of the injustices they seek to remedy. (I’ll often simply 
say foreign influence, but this will always be short for foreign influence aimed at promoting 
justice in the recipient society.1) Discussing foreign influence exercised by both state and non-
state actors, and aimed at redressing all kinds of injustice, allows me to address a class of cases 
neglected by others in the literature. Though I’ll discuss some coercive and forceful interventions 
as contrast cases, I’ll mainly focus on justice-promoting foreign influence that uses non-coercive 
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and non-forceful means—since this phenomenon is both common in global politics and under-
treated in the literature. Similarly, though I’ll reference some efforts to avert atrocities, my main 
focus will be foreign influence meant to address “ordinary” injustice2—another phenomenon 
existing literature neglects. Moreover, developing a unified theory of the ethics of foreign 
influence allows me to improve upon the normative conclusions (even the correct ones) of more 
narrowly-focused theories: just as ethical standards meant to guide the use of a particular tactic 
in resisting domestic injustice would be improved if incorporated into a broader theory of how 
we should pursue domestic justice generally, ethical standards meant to guide the use of a 
particular tactic in resisting global injustice would be improved if incorporated into a broader 
theory of how we should pursue justice on the global stage. 
The next section engages with several real-world cases of foreign influence to identify 
two morally significant but under-appreciated dimensions along which instances of foreign 
influence can differ: (1) the degree of control foreign influencers exercise over recipients, and (2) 
to what extent they interfere with the operation of recipients’ political institutions. How a case of 
foreign influence fares on these dimensions affects the conditions under which it’s permissible or 
not. Indeed, once we appreciate these differences, we’ll see that not all foreign influence is 
vulnerable to the powerful objections often leveled against intervention. 
Intervention is often thought to treat members of recipient societies intolerantly (Rawls, 
1999; Walzer, 1994, 1997; see also Godfrey-Smith and Kerr, 2019, who essentially define 
toleration as non-interference), to fail to properly recognize their legitimate political institutions 
(Walzer, 1980, 2007; Altman and Wellman, 2009; Buchanan, 2003; Luban, 1980), and/or to 
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perpetuate colonial hierarchies (Anghie, 2006; Mutua, 2000; Koskenniemi, 2001). But here, I’ll 
argue that some types of foreign influence are, at least pro tanto, morally permissible because 
they’re immune to these standard objections. Though the standard objections may be easily 
overridden when foreign influence is needed to redress very grave injustices, I’ll argue that some 
foreign influence escapes these objections even when their moral force is strongest—when 
foreigners only aim to remedy “ordinary” injustices. I’ll then argue that our findings about what 
types of foreign influence are permissible suggest we should adopt two presumptions—one in 
favor of influence that exerts comparatively little control over its recipients, and one in favor of 
influence exerted by those currently or historically disempowered in global politics, which I call 
counter-hegemonic influence. 
Finally, I’ll draw another, overarching conclusion: the promotion of justice worldwide is 
an acceptable goal of global political engagement. This isn’t only true in exceptional cases, such 
as when atrocities are imminent. It’s true as a matter of course, in the quotidian circumstances of 
global politics. Just as there are, generally, permissible ways to engage in political contestation in 
our own societies in order to achieve justice, so there are, generally, permissible ways to do the 
same by influencing other societies. Note, I’m only able to make this argument because I address 
the ethics of foreign influence in non-exceptional cases (i.e., when it seeks to remedy “ordinary” 
injustice). Those (e.g. Pattison, 2018a) who only discuss foreign influence meant to alleviate 
extraordinarily grave injustices can tell the international community how to choose among 
different ways of exerting influence in this narrow set of cases—when international involvement 
itself is relatively uncontroversial. The unified theory of the ethics of foreign influence I begin to 
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develop here addresses a wider universe of cases. And this allows me to go further than Pattison 
(2018a), to suggest that—because my analysis shows certain kinds of foreign influence may be 
justified even when they aim to redress merely “ordinary” injustice—certain kinds of foreign 
influence may be permissible even in cases in which the propriety of international involvement 
itself is disputed.  Ultimately, I suggest we begin to see the world, not only our domestic 
societies, as an arena in which we may practice politics in the pursuit of justice. 
Expanding our Focus: Different Types of Foreign Influence 
To develop a more complete ethics of foreign influence, we must appreciate the full 
range of forms it can take and the normatively important ways in which cases of foreign 
influence can differ. In this section, I identify two such ways. First, foreign influence can differ 
in the degree to which it deprives recipients of the ability to freely adopt policies of their own 
choosing, as a result of their own freely-formed judgments. Call this the degree of control 
foreign influencers exercise. Here, I won’t develop a full account of what it means to choose or 
judge “freely.” This would be a project unto itself. Instead, I’ll simply assume a person is unfree 
when she is induced to act—partially or fully—on something other than her own will, or when 
the content of her will is determined by others instead of by her own independent judgments. 
Someone is made unfree when others limit her options (inducing her to act on their will) or 
manipulate her (deceiving or indoctrinating her to determine the content of her will themselves, 
rather than leaving it up to the unimpeded operation of her own rational faculties). 
Control and freedom so understood occur in degrees. Correspondingly, foreign 
influencers can subject recipients to more or less control; influencers can leave recipients more 
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free to make their own judgments and decisions about how to act, or can make them less so. On 
one end of the proverbial spectrum are cases of what I’ll call totally-controlling influence. In 
such cases, foreign influence makes it virtually impossible for recipients to act against the 
influencers’ wishes, or to act on their own freely-formed judgments. Recipients have no choice 
but to acquiesce to foreign influencers’ demands. 
The clearest examples of totally-controlling foreign influence involve military force—
like that NATO deployed in Libya in 2011. However, foreign influencers need not use force to 
exercise total control. Extreme manipulation, perhaps taking the form of totalizing indoctrination 
or misinformation campaigns, can also be totally controlling. Take Walzer’s hypothetical in 
which Sweden is able to release a chemical into Algeria’s water supply to transform Algerians—
who support a repressive military theocracy—into social democrats (Walzer, 1980: 225-6). 
Releasing the chemical would prevent Algerians from acting on their freely-formed judgments 
because it would prevent them from forming judgments freely. Thus, the Swedes’ influence 
would be totally-controlling, though not forceful.  
While this clearly demonstrates the conceptual possibility of exercising total control 
without physical force, we arguably shouldn’t expect any real-world actor to carry out an 
operation like the one described above. However, the US Army and CIA’s past experiments with 
mind-control using psychedelic drugs and the CIA’s recent study of “truth serum” as an 
interrogation tool3 illustrate that real political actors may very well develop the capacity to exert 
total control without physical force—even if their present capacity (or willingness to deploy such 
techniques) is more limited than the Swedes’ in Walzer’s hypothetical case. 
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Foreign influence that makes recipients’ acting against the influencer’s wishes possible 
only at the expense of their vital interests, or that impairs (without totally eviscerating) 
recipients’ abilities to form judgments freely, I will call highly-controlling. I understand “vital 
interests” to include interests whose fulfillment is necessary for living a minimally decent human 
life, a phrase I borrow from David Miller (2007). I use the phrase as Miller does, to describe a 
life free of very serious and virtually universally-recognized physical and psycho-social harms 
(D. Miller, 2007: 178-85). Vital interests include, for example, interests in physical security, 
subsistence, basic education, and an adequate (though not a maximal, or even necessarily a fair) 
range of choices of occupation, cultural and religious practice, and family life (D. Miller, 2007: 
178-85, 207-8). Note, the point here is not merely to say that highly-controlling influence might 
endanger recipients’ vital interests. Rather, it is to identify influencers’ deliberate endangerment 
of (or refusal to secure) recipients’ vital interests in order to get recipients to act as they wish as 
a distinguishing feature of highly-controlling influence. Such activity raises distinct moral issues, 
beyond those raised by the mere possibility that an act of foreign influence could have the 
consequence of endangering vital interests. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s imposition of “structural 
adjustment” programs on developing countries in the 1980s constituted highly-controlling 
influence. Essentially, the IMF and World Bank made badly-needed loans available to the 
developing world only on the condition that local governments adopt “free market” reforms (R. 
Miller, 2010: 136-41). Insofar as people in recipient countries needed credit to alleviate 
economic crises that threatened their vital interests, they had no reasonable choice but to accept 
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the IMF and World Bank’s terms. Their adopting the required policies primarily reflected the 
wills of IMF and World Bank members, rather than their own. 
Note, analyzing foreign influence through the lens of control allows us to capture a 
morally important feature of aid conditionality that Fabre’s (2018) recent treatment largely 
neglects. Namely, Fabre’s (2018: 126) analysis of whether the IMF and World Bank were 
justified in conditioning aid to economically vulnerable countries (e.g., Bolivia and Tanzania) on 
the privatization of their public water systems hinges largely on whether this choice produced 
“egregiously unjust outcomes.” However, as I’ll argue below, the degree of control foreign 
influencers exercise has a significant impact on whether their influence is morally permissible, 
regardless of its expected or actual effects. In other words, my analysis explains why the mere 
fact that aid (or loan) recipients were so vulnerable so as to have no reasonable choice but to 
accept the IMF and World Bank’s terms made the imposition of conditions morally suspect, 
regardless of how likely it was to produce good or bad consequences. Thus, my approach gives 
us the resources to criticize exploitative uses of geopolitical power as such, without needing to 
evaluate the utility of their consequences. 
Foreign influencers may also exercise slightly-controlling influence—which makes 
recipients’ acting against the influencer’s wishes possible only at the expense of their non-vital 
interests. Take the preferential trade agreement the US signed with Oman in 2006, containing 
protections for workers’ rights. The US certainly leveraged its disproportionate political and 
economic power to get Oman to agree to these provisions, and to adopt labor reforms during the 
negotiations leading up to the agreement’s signing (Hafner-Burton, 2009: 147-9). Indeed, Oman 
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had strong reason to want a trade deal with the US: Oman’s economy was heavily dependent on 
its oil reserves, which were projected to run out in the coming decades; thus, the country wanted 
to diversify its economy, and a trade deal with the US would help it do so (Hafner-Burton, 2009: 
147).  
So, Oman was put in the position of having to choose between adopting the US’s desired 
labor reforms or absorbing a significant cost (losing the trade deal and the prospect of a 
diversified economy along with it). But the trade deal wasn’t so central to the achievement of 
Omanis’ vital interests that they essentially had no choice but to agree to whatever offer the US 
made. Oman’s position wasn’t like that of the societies subjected to structural adjustment 
programs. 
Finally, some foreign influencers exercise what I call persuasive influence, trying to 
convince recipients to act a certain way without exercising any control over them. Tostan’s work 
in western Africa is a good example. An international nonprofit organization, Tostan’s 
representatives enter a community (after being invited) and establish what they call a 
“Community Empowerment Program,” consisting of classes taught in local languages by people 
who live in the community for their duration and employ traditional African teaching techniques 
(Tostan, n.d.(a), n.d.(c), 2014: 6-7). The classes are typically geared toward promoting ends like 
ending female genital cutting (FGC) and child marriage, and promoting grassroots democracy 
and public health (Tostan, n.d.(b)). Rather than imposing its desired policies on the communities 
it interacts with, Tostan seeks to educate and persuade them in the hope that they’ll adopt those 
policies on their own (for a statement of Tostan’s general commitment to empowerment and 
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regard for host communities’ agency, see Tostan, 2014). In the case of FGC, for example, 
Tostan’s goal (achieved in many cases) has been to encourage host communities to declare an 
end to the practice, not to forcibly end it regardless of community sentiment (Diop et al., 2004; 
Tostan, n.d.(d)). 
As we’ll see later, whether a case of foreign influence is totally-controlling, highly-
controlling, slightly-controlling, or persuasive can affect which moral objections it’s vulnerable 
to, and therefore under what conditions it’s justifiable. For now, let’s examine one more way in 
which cases of foreign influence can differ. 
Foreign influencers may employ means that interfere more or less extensively with the 
operation of recipient societies’ formal political institutions, and this too can have normative 
consequences. Some foreign influencers, like NATO in Libya, seek to achieve their ends by 
overthrowing recipients’ institutions entirely. However, not all foreign influence is regime-
changing influence. Foreign influencers may instead pursue their ends by working in opposition 
to some elements of recipients’ institutions (e.g., by preventing the enforcement of a particular 
law or interfering with the normal operation of some government agency) without attempting to 
bring about their total collapse. I’ll call this oppositional influence. 
Alternatively, foreign influencers might pursue their ends without directly interacting 
with recipients’ institutions at all: they may engage in what I’ll call extra-institutional influence. 
Extra-institutional influencers may still seek to make changes in recipient societies’ 
institutions—by advocating for a new law, for example. Their distinguishing feature is that they 
don’t try to effect these changes by directly interacting with recipients’ formal political 
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institutions. Boycott and divestment campaigns exemplify this kind of intervention. Take for 
example, international efforts to oppose the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL): 
the German bank BayernLB, the Dutch banking and financial services company ING, and 
several Norwegian companies divested money they had contributed to funding DAPL or its 
parent companies (Two Bulls and Remle, 2017; Wong, 2017). In doing so, these companies 
effectively sought to obstruct DAPL’s construction, but without interfering with the operation of 
any American political institutions. 
 Finally, foreigners may exert intra-systemic influence, trying to achieve their ends by 
working through recipients’ existing institutions. Take, for example, the political fallout from 
Arizona’s immigration bill, SB 1070, which contained several anti-immigrant provisions—
including one allowing warrantless arrests of people police believed to be undocumented 
(Sherman, 2012; State of Arizona, 2010). When SB 1070 made its way to the US Supreme 
Court, several Latin American countries submitted amicus briefs opposing it (Brief for Argentina 
et al., 2012; Brief for the Republic of Haiti, 2012; Brief for the United Mexican States, 2012). 
This was, at least in part, an attempt to promote justice in the US, as evidenced by Mexico’s 
invocation of its citizens’ rights and the rights of other Latin Americans in the US. Mexico 
writes, “SB 1070 adversely impacts...the rights and lives of Mexican citizens and other persons 
of Latin American descent in Arizona” (Brief for the United Mexican States, 2012: 4, emphasis 
added). 
Again, whether foreigners exert regime-changing, oppositional, extra-institutional, or 
intra-systemic influence can affect whether their actions are vulnerable to certain moral 
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objections and therefore ultimately (im)permissible. The following sections further explore the 
normative implications of foreign influence falling into one or another of these categories. 
Overcoming Common Objections to Intervention 
This section outlines the main moral objections usually leveled against intervention, and, 
drawing on the categories developed above, argues that certain kinds of foreign influence are 
immune to these objections. My aim in doing this won’t always be to show that the standard 
objections to intervention are mistaken per se. After all, they are at least sometimes meant to 
apply to a range of actions (“intervention,” involving states using coercion or force) narrower 
than my topic here (“foreign influence,” including any deliberate attempt to promote justice in 
another society). Rather, I aim to show that the standard objections don’t tell the whole story. 
Even if they are sound objections against some “interventions,” they aren’t always sound 
objections against other kinds of foreign influence.  
Treating Recipients with Toleration 
One common objection to intervention—especially when its aim is justice promotion—is 
that it treats recipients with intolerance (see Godfrey-Smith and Kerr, 2019; Rawls, 1999; 
Walzer, 1994, 1997). The thought is that interveners impose their own values on people in the 
recipient society—values the recipients don’t accept—thereby forcing recipients to live by 
intervenes’ values and in accordance with interveners’ preferences, rather than their own. 
However, not all foreign influence treats recipients with intolerance. For example, those 
who exert persuasive foreign influence, and who try to persuade recipient populations (either 
directly or through sufficiently representative governments authorized to act on their behalf) to 
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adopt some justice-enhancing reform, treat recipients with toleration. (This position is subject to 
one important proviso, which I’ll elaborate later.) After all, foreign influencers using persuasion 
alone don’t “impose” their values on recipients; they only produce change conditional upon the 
influencers’ proposals being voluntarily taken up by the recipient population (or their duly 
appointed representatives).  
As noted earlier, Tostan’s work is a striking example of persuasive influence. Though 
Tostan clearly has an agenda, its representatives don’t simply impose it on recipient 
communities. Instead, preserving recipients’ ability to live according to their own values, Tostan 
seeks to convince them to adopt certain values and make choices reflecting those values on their 
own. In fact, Tostan has sometimes failed to achieve its aims because its representatives were 
rejected by recipient communities, demonstrating the conditionality of its success on recipient 
support (Diop et al., 2004, 35). 
Foreigners who exert slightly-controlling influence (either directly over a recipient 
population, or over a sufficiently representative government authorized to act on their behalf) 
also treat recipients with toleration. (Again, this position is subject to a proviso I’ll elaborate 
below.) Recall that slightly-controlling influence involves imposing some cost—but not a 
devastating cost—on recipients if they don’t adopt the influencers’ preferred behavior. It leaves 
recipients able to act contrary to foreign influencers’ preferences, but only at the expense of an 
interest of theirs—albeit a non-vital interest. 
Consider the US-Oman trade negotiations described above. Let’s assume, arguendo, that 
Oman’s government at the time of the negotiations was sufficiently representative such that 
This is the “Accepted Version” of “Promoting Justice Across Borders,” distributed in line with 
SAGE’s guidelines on sharing published work. 
 
Version of Record: Lucia M. Rafanelli, “Promoting Justice Across Borders,” Political Studies 
(2019), DOI: 10.1177/0032321719875402 
 
  
 14 
Omani negotiators qualified as duly authorized representatives of the Omani people. Given this, 
we can say the US exerted slightly-controlling influence over a sufficiently representative 
government authorized to act on behalf of Omani citizens. Oman was made to choose between 
adopting the US’s desired labor reforms or losing the prospect of a trade deal with the US 
(sacrificing an important but non-vital interest of theirs) (Hafner-Burton, 2009: 146-9). However, 
there is no meaningful sense in which Omanis were forced to adopt these labor reforms 
regardless of their own preferences (the paradigm case of intolerance). They may have been 
forced to rank their preferences—to decide which they valued more, maintaining lax workers’ 
rights protections, or a beneficial trade agreement with the US. But Oman could have accepted 
either option without putting its citizens’ vital interests or basic rights at additional risk, 
compared to the pre-foreign-influence status quo. 
And, in general, making it such that someone must absorb a reasonable cost in order to 
act as she pleases isn’t the same as forcing her to live in accordance with foreign values or 
preferences (i.e., intolerance); after all, toleration doesn’t require making others’ chosen lifestyle 
costless. Indeed, it would be difficult to understand what it meant to say someone valued a 
certain way of life if she were unwilling to accept any costs to continue it. Thus, slightly-
controlling influences like the US’s influence over Oman don’t treat recipients with intolerance. 
Here, I’ve argued that when foreigners exert persuasive or slightly-controlling influence 
over recipient populations (either directly or through sufficiently representative governments 
authorized to act on their behalf), they treat recipients with toleration. In reality, this proposition 
is subject to a proviso: it only holds true if the actions foreign influencers advocate wouldn’t, if 
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taken, subject recipients to more intolerance in their own society, compared to the pre-foreign-
influence status quo. We could imagine, for example, foreigners trying to persuade a recipient 
population to discriminate against citizens belonging to religious minorities. Such influence, 
though persuasive, could rightly be criticized as intolerant (toward the religious minorities 
residing in the recipient society). But, as long as foreign influencers avoid encouraging 
intolerance in the societies they influence (as did Tostan and the US in the cases described 
above), the proposition argued for here holds. 
Recognizing Recipient States’ Legitimacy 
Another common objection to intervention says it denies proper recognition to recipients’ 
legitimate political institutions. Walzer (1980: 217-8, 2007: 257-8) argues that, except under 
very extreme circumstances—such as massacre, mass enslavement, mass expulsion, or mass 
starvation—outsiders should treat foreign states4 as if they are legitimate. These states have 
“presumptive legitimacy” (Walzer, 1980: 214-8). Intervention, the argument continues, is 
impermissible against legitimate (including presumptively legitimate) institutions (Walzer, 1980: 
214-8). But if states are only rendered illegitimate under the extreme (and rare) circumstances 
enumerated above, intervention must be generally impermissible. 
Others (e.g., Altman and Wellman, 2009; Buchanan, 2003; Luban, 1980) hold that states 
are rendered illegitimate when they commit wrongs less grievous than those Walzer identifies. 
But virtually no one holds that only fully just states can be legitimate. Thus, one might think 
intervention aimed at promoting justice in general, rather than at alleviating only the gravest 
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injustices, was especially likely to treat actually (or at least presumptively) legitimate states as 
illegitimate—and therefore especially likely to be impermissible. 
Here, I’ll argue that the legitimacy objection doesn’t apply to all types of foreign 
influence (even when the injustices they seek to remedy aren’t especially grave), because not all 
foreign influence involves denying recipient states’ legitimacy. In particular, I’ll argue that intra-
systemic influence and some cases of extra-institutional influence are justifiable even when 
recipient states are legitimate. 5 I won’t take a position on what makes a state legitimate or 
illegitimate. All that’s necessary for my argument is to show that foreigners exercising intra-
systemic influence and some kinds of extra-institutional influence treat recipient states as 
outsiders ought to treat legitimate states. If this is true, foreign influencers can’t be accused of 
wrongly treating recipient states as illegitimate and therefore must be immune to the legitimacy 
objection. 
I’ll assume (along the lines of the legitimacy objection) that there are limits on how 
outsiders can permissibly behave toward legitimate institutions. Theorists disagree about what 
these limits are, but all plausible views share some basic features: they hold that legitimate states 
are justified in making and enforcing policy within their jurisdictions, and that they deserve a 
certain, elevated international status. Thus, I’ll assume that outsiders to a legitimate state ought 
to (1) grant it authority to decide and implement domestic policy (policy-making authority), and 
(2) grant (or at least not deny) it “good standing” in the international community. I’ll further 
assume that a state is denied “good standing” in the international community when other states 
deny it the privileges standardly granted to legitimate states, including the privilege to conduct a 
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(non-aggressive) foreign policy of its own choosing. In Allen Buchanan’s (2003: 145) words, 
recognizing states as legitimate means recognizing them “as possessors of the full bundle of 
powers, liberties, rights, and immunities that constitute sovereignty.” I’ll then argue that 
foreigners exerting intra-systemic influence, and some kinds of extra-institutional influence, can 
fulfill both conditions (1) and (2), thereby treating recipient states as if they’re legitimate. 
Let’s start with intra-systemic influence. Those who use intra-systemic influence engage 
in political contestation through recipients’ established institutions, and only in ways allowed by 
the rules of those institutions. For instance, the Latin American countries who submitted amicus 
briefs to the US Supreme Court opposing Arizona’s SB 1070 attempted to change US law. But 
their attempt didn’t in any way discredit US political institutions, as the rules of these very 
institutions provided that the courts should review the law in question, that they should consider 
amicus briefs, and that foreign countries were allowed to submit briefs. Far from denying their 
legitimacy, if anything, the act of submitting amicus briefs signaled an acknowledgement that 
US institutions were legitimate. When opponents to the political status quo channel their 
opposition through the official channels of the powers they oppose, they implicitly signal that 
these institutions have legitimate authority over their political arena.6 Surely, one could justify 
intra-systemic influence like this while maintaining the recipient state had a claim to policy-
making authority, and intra-systemic influence does nothing to deny recipient states good 
standing in the international community. So, intra-systemic foreign influence is justifiable even 
when recipient states are legitimate. 
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We can say the same about some exercises of extra-institutional foreign influence—
whereby foreigners encourage political change in a recipient society, but without directly 
interacting with its formal political institutions. The rest of this sub-section will argue that 
exertions of extra-institutional influence over legitimate states are justifiable as long as (a) they 
don’t involve force, and they match one of the following descriptions: (b) they’re undertaken by 
non-state actors; (c) they’re either slightly-controlling or persuasive, and they’re undertaken by 
state actors who are not more geopolitically powerful than their recipients; or (d) they’re either 
slightly-controlling or persuasive, and they’re undertaken by state actors who are more 
geopolitically powerful than recipients, but who leverage their superior power to undermine the 
power structures that advantaged them in the first place. In order for my argument to succeed, I’ll 
have to show that foreigners exerting extra-institutional influence meeting criterion (a) and one 
of criteria (b)-(d) treat recipients as outsiders ought to treat legitimate foreign states. In other 
words, I’ll have to show (as I did in the case of intra-systemic influence) that these foreign 
influencers meet conditions (1) and (2) from above.  
Condition (1) says that outsiders must grant legitimate foreign states policy-making 
authority, and, I hold, those who exert extra-institutional influence do precisely this—as long as 
they don’t use force against recipients. When influencers use force, they attempt to directly 
implement their own preferred policies in recipient societies. They therefore deny recipient states 
an exclusive claim to policy-making authority. They fail to meet condition (1), at least to a 
degree. (This aligns with the intuition that forceful action is typically forbidden against 
legitimate institutions.) 
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As long as they refrain from using force, though, foreigners exerting extra-institutional 
influence do meet condition (1). After all, though extra-institutional influence may aim to 
influence the behavior of recipient states’ officials, it only does so by means that are themselves 
compatible with recipient institutions’ continued existence and normal operation. Note, the 
requirement that an exercise of influence not interfere with recipient institutions’ normal 
operation is important. One could imagine, for example, a boycott movement that so devastated 
the recipient state’s economy that its established political institutions were unable to function 
adequately. Intuitively, it would be impermissible for outsiders to exert this kind of disruptive 
influence on a legitimate state. This is true enough, but such influence—precisely because it 
would be disruptive—would count as oppositional, rather than extra-institutional.  
Thus, foreigners exerting extra-institutional influence don’t challenge recipient states’ 
policy-making authority (they meet condition (1)), as long as they don’t use force (as long as 
they meet criterion (a)). We haven’t yet shown, though, that exerting extra-institutional influence 
over legitimate states is justifiable. In order to do this, we must show that foreigners exerting 
extra-institutional influence meet not only condition (1), but also condition (2) (that they grant, 
or at least don’t deny, recipient states “good standing” in the international community). Below, 
I’ll argue that foreigners exerting extra-institutional influence can grant (or at least not deny) 
recipient states good standing in the international community, as long as their exertions of 
influence meet one of criteria (b)-(d) above. Since we’ve already argued that foreign influencers 
must refrain from using force against recipient states in order to treat them as legitimate states, 
I’ll confine the rest of this sub-section’s discussion to non-forceful extra-institutional influence. 
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When non-state actors exert extra-institutional influence (when foreign influence meets 
criterion (b)), they don’t deny recipient states good standing in the international community. This 
is because, in the international community as it’s usually conceived, only states are capable of 
granting or denying members (or would-be members) good standing.7 This reflects not a deep, 
immutable moral truth, but a contingent fact about the way the concept of good standing has 
developed in global politics as-practiced (and, often, as-theorized). The traditional picture of the 
international community is one of a society-of-states. Since states are the members of this 
community, it is states that enjoy good standing or don’t, and states that grant others good 
standing or deny it. Note, I don’t claim that any state enjoying good standing is necessarily 
legitimate or that any state denied it is illegitimate. Again, I won’t endorse any particular view 
about what makes states legitimate here. Instead, I claim that denying a state good standing in the 
international community is one way for outsiders to treat that state as if it is illegitimate; and that 
only states can deny good standing in the international community to other states. 
There may of course be other kinds of community on the global stage, in which non-state 
actors could perhaps grant or deny states good standing. However, if there were such a 
community—say, a “global civil society” collective, containing both states and international 
NGOs—membership (and therefore good standing) in it would not obviously be connected to 
political legitimacy in the way membership in the international community conceptualized as a 
society-of-states is. After all, this hypothetical global community would contain many members-
in-good-standing (NGOs) not even claiming (let alone recognized as having) political legitimacy. 
Membership-in-good-standing in this global community would not be premised on legitimacy, so 
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it’s unclear whether revoking a member’s good standing could be interpreted as a denial of its 
legitimacy. Hence the specific formulation of condition (2): in order to treat a state as legitimate, 
outsiders must grant, or at least not deny, it good standing in the international community—and 
good standing in the international community is something that can be denied only by other 
states.  
Some might object that maintaining only states can grant or deny good standing in the 
international community ignores the following reality: some non-state actors (e.g., large NGOs 
or multinational corporations) have enough political clout that their condemnation of or refusal 
to engage with a state could have significant negative consequences for that state. I don’t deny 
this. However, not everything that negatively affects a state (even significantly) amounts to 
denying it good standing in the international community. There are of course ethical concerns 
raised when non-state actors deliberately behave so as to adversely impact a particular state. For 
example, they may threaten to negatively impact the state as a means of exercising control over 
it, thereby raising the question of whether such control is justifiable and implicating the ethical 
issues discussed in the previous sub-section. But these are not identical to the ethical issues 
raised when states deny other states the international status owed to legitimate sovereign bodies. 
To illustrate the distinction, consider the difference between a multinational corporation refusing 
to do business with some state and other states refusing to “do business with it” by refusing to 
recognize it as a sovereign entity. Both refusals may negatively impact the state in question, but 
only the latter denies it the status routinely granted to members in good standing in the 
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international community considered as a society-of-states. Only the latter clearly amounts to 
treating the state in question as if it’s illegitimate. 
We can thus conclude that extra-institutional influence exerted by non-state actors (i.e., 
that which meets criterion (b)) is justifiable even when recipient states are legitimate. Foreigners 
exerting this kind of influence grant recipient states policy-making authority and don’t deny 
them good standing in the international community; so, they treat recipient states as they ought to 
treat legitimate states. This means, interestingly, that foreign companies’ divestment from DAPL 
may have been justified even on the assumption that the US had exclusive legitimate authority to 
decide whether the pipeline was built. I don’t mean to suggest by saying this that Native 
American communities shouldn’t have shared in this authority—I believe they should have. But 
it’s an interesting finding that even someone who denied this couldn’t oppose foreign divestment 
from DAPL on the grounds that foreign companies failed to recognize the US government as the 
sole legitimate authority on the matter. Since these companies treated the US government as 
legitimate, their actions were justifiable even assuming the US government had an exclusive 
claim to policy-making authority at Standing Rock.  
Importantly, this mode of foreign influence, which escapes the legitimacy objection, also 
escapes the notice of others writing about the ethics of foreign-influence-via-economic-
leverage—such as Fabre (2018), who excludes non-state actors from her analysis, and Pattison 
(2018a: 129), whose otherwise wide-ranging treatment of non-military foreign influence 
discusses consumer (or corporate) boycotts only in the very narrow context of “civilian defense” 
against an external aggressor or occupying force. Thus, again, the existing literature’s artificially 
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narrow focus obscures a type of foreign influence that may surmount the usual objections to 
intervention—giving the impression that these objections are stronger than they really are. 
This leaves us with the question of when states exerting extra-institutional influence on 
other states do or don’t deny the latter good standing in the international community. Highly- and 
totally-controlling influence straightforwardly deny recipient states good standing. These kinds 
of influence leave recipients no (reasonable) option but to acquiesce to foreign influencers’ 
demands. Influencers’ sheer military or geopolitical power virtually guarantees recipients will do 
their bidding, and recipients are made into mere puppets of their foreign influencers. Whatever 
enjoying good standing in the international community requires, it must at least require not being 
the mere instrument of other members’ (i.e., other states’) wills.  
Some may argue that less controlling types of foreign influence can also turn recipient 
states into mere puppets—namely, when they reinforce existing geopolitical hierarchies that 
consistently establish recipient states as inferiors to other (state) members of the international 
community. Though these recipient states are not literally forced to do foreign influencers’ 
bidding, other states’ consistent reinforcement of their inferior position amounts to a denial of 
equal status that may effectively prevent them from enjoying the standard privileges of fully 
sovereign states—and so may prevent them from enjoying good standing in the international 
community. 
This is a serious worry, but it can be avoided in two ways: either foreign influencers must 
not be more geopolitically powerful than recipients, or, if they are more geopolitically powerful 
than recipients, they must leverage their power to undermine the power structures that 
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advantaged them in the first place (that is, either criterion (c) or (d) must be met). In the first 
case, where influencers are not more powerful than recipients, there’s clearly no danger of their 
influence reinforcing their already disproportionate power. With regards to the second case, we 
would be mistaken to say that any time a geopolitically powerful state utilized its power to 
influence less powerful states, it denied them good standing in the international community. 
After all, even powerful states find themselves embedded in geopolitical power structures that 
aren’t easy to dismantle. Whenever they act, they act within these power structures, and it may 
therefore be virtually impossible for them to act without leveraging their unequal power. There 
must, though, be some way for states to grant each other good international standing even as they 
are embedded in social and political structures that give them unequal power (lest the concept of 
good international standing become normatively inert and wholly inapplicable to the real world). 
Powerful states meet this challenge when, though they leverage their unequal power, they do so 
in ways that amplify the voices of less powerful states, effectively raising the latter’s political 
stature, and undercutting the established hierarchies that subjugate them. In the context of 
foreign influence, this could involve foreign influencers (for example) opening themselves up to 
the same kinds of outside influence they exert on others or subjecting their influence to approval 
or oversight by less powerful states. 
Thus, if either criterion (c) or (d) is met, even a state-led exertion of extra-institutional 
influence (as long as it’s non-forceful) will not deny its recipient state good international 
standing. We’ve already shown this kind of influence doesn’t deny recipient states policy-
making authority, so we can conclude those exerting it treat recipient states as they ought to treat 
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legitimate states. State-led (non-forceful) extra-institutional influence is therefore justifiable even 
when recipient states are legitimate, as long as it meets either criterion (c) or (d). 
We have, then, shown what we set out to: exertions of extra-institutional influence over 
legitimate states are justifiable as long as (a) they don’t involve force, and they match one of the 
following descriptions: (b) they’re undertaken by non-state actors; (c) they’re either slightly-
controlling or persuasive, and they’re undertaken by state actors who are not more geopolitically 
powerful than their recipients; or (d) they’re either slightly-controlling or persuasive, and they’re 
undertaken by state actors who are more geopolitically powerful than recipients, but who 
leverage their superior power to undermine the power structures that advantaged them in the first 
place. 
 
 
Contesting (Neo-)Colonial Hierarchies 
The final objection to intervention I’ll consider here says it’s objectionable because it perpetuates 
the historically-established racialized hierarchies associated with colonialism (see Anghie, 2006; 
Mutua, 2000). As in earlier sub-sections, I’ll argue here that some foreign influence escapes this 
objection. First of all, foreign influencers won’t always belong to groups historically privileged 
by colonial hierarchies, and recipients won’t always belong to groups historically disadvantaged 
by them. Foreign influencers can’t perpetuate colonial subordination by exerting influence over 
societies that colonial hierarchies identify as their equals or their superiors.  
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For example, the Latin American countries who submitted amicus briefs to the US 
Supreme Court didn’t subject the US to neo-colonial subordination. In fact, their actions 
challenged the colonial hierarchies that have historically established white residents of the 
Global North as colonizers (“civilizers,” interveners) and people of color in the Global South 
(including Latin America) as colonized (recipients of foreign influence). Similarly, the European 
companies that divested from DAPL didn’t perpetuate colonial hierarchies, because they don’t 
occupy a higher position in those hierarchies than the recipients of their influence (US companies 
and the US government). In fact, insofar as divesting from DAPL challenged the asymmetrical 
power relationship between the US government and the Native American communities it has 
colonized and displaced, we might even consider divestment another challenge to (neo-
)colonialism. 
Of course, in some cases, foreign influencers do belong to groups historically privileged 
by colonial hierarchies. But, even when they do, there are ways they can exert influence without 
objectionably perpetuating those hierarchies. Imagine that foreign influencers treat recipients 
with toleration, that they treat recipient institutions as legitimate, and that there's no general 
pattern of foreign influence establishing those historically marginalized by colonialism as 
recipients and those historically empowered by it as influencers (or, if there is such a pattern, 
foreign influencers work to undermine it). When foreign influencers meet these conditions, they 
don’t perpetuate colonial hierarchies. Their influence lacks the distinguishing features of 
colonialism. Note, I aim to identify the standards foreign influence must meet in order to avoid 
perpetuating or reproducing the hierarchies associated with colonialism as it was actually 
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practiced. This focus will allow me to determine when foreign influence poses a particularly 
salient danger—when it perpetuates objectionable ways of treating certain people, which 
manners of treatment have made up a significant portion of global politics and international law 
as their associated practices have in fact unfolded—without getting distracted by the question of 
whether an act of foreign influence aligns with some ahistorical, ideal-typical account of 
colonialism. Indeed, Valentini (2015) suggests that the real wrongs of colonialism are to be 
found in the evils of its historical manifestations, and it is these historically-manifested wrongs I 
propose contemporary foreign influencers should be especially careful to avoid. 
One distinguishing feature of (historical) colonialism was its denial that colonial subjects 
were fully-developed persons. As Anghie (2006) emphasizes, colonizers routinely characterized 
colonial subjects as “uncivilized,” and recognized them as persons only to the extent necessary to 
sanction them for their alleged deficiencies as compared with Western standards of genuinely 
“human” behavior. Similarly, Koskenniemi (2001: 101) recounts the rise of the “Comparative 
Method” in 19th-century international law, which “viewed primitive peoples as earlier stages of 
human development in an overall law-like frame of progressive history.” He describes how 
international lawyers invoked different (perceived) levels of “civilization” to justify differential 
grants of political and legal recognition to non-Europeans, sometimes explicitly comparing them 
to children (Koskenniemi, 2001: 127-32). But foreign influencers can avoid denying recipients 
are fully-developed persons by treating them with toleration (by treating recipients as 
presumptively entitled to live by their own lights). As argued earlier, when influencers treat 
recipients with toleration, they recognize recipients as sources of weighty claims about how their 
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lives should go and what rules should govern them—the same kinds of claims that any people 
interacting as political equals would recognize each other as having. 
A second central element of colonialism was that colonizers unjustifiably deprived 
colonial subjects of the ability to exercise their own political authority (which denial 
was premised on the view that they weren’t fully-developed persons). Koskenniemi (2001) 
explains how colonizers didn't go so far as to deny the colonized had any valid claims of their 
own, but did deny colonized persons' standing to bring certain kinds of claims—claims to full 
political and legal recognition and inclusion in the international community on terms of equality 
with Europeans. Ypi (2013:168-9) similarly notes that apologists for “civilizing-mission” 
colonialism often invoked the failure or incapacity of colonized people to establish legitimate 
political institutions of their own (and therefore their supposed lack of a valid claim to exercise 
their own political authority) in its defense. We might characterize this as a refusal to properly 
regard what Stilz (2015, 2015a, 2016) calls the “maker interests” of colonized people—their 
interests in making and remaking their own political institutions together, as part of a joint 
project (Stilz, 2015a: 3).  However, if foreigners exert only the kinds of influence that are 
compatible with recipients’ institutions being legitimate, then they don’t deny recipients the 
ability to exercise their own political authority. They interact with recipient institutions as they 
would be justified interacting with any legitimate political authority, not as colonial powers who 
rule over recipients precisely because the latter’s independent institutions are (allegedly) 
illegitimate. 
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Colonialism’s third central feature was that it wasn’t a series of isolated oppressive acts, 
each individually unjustified (though, certainly, colonizers committed many discrete injustices). 
Colonialism was a practice that rationalized and instituted patterns of behavior establishing some 
groups (e.g., Europeans, white people, residents of the Global North and West) as superiors and 
others (e.g., people of color, residents of the Global South) as inferiors. Thus, even if individual 
cases of foreign influence meet the criteria above, such that no one on its own counts as a 
perpetuation of colonial hierarchies, it’s possible that a practice or a pattern of foreign influence, 
in which those historically empowered by colonialism exerted influence over those historically 
marginalized by it, could perpetuate colonial hierarchies nonetheless. To avoid this, we need not 
eliminate all instances of historically-empowered foreigners exerting influence on historically-
marginalized recipients. But we should avoid creating neo-colonial behavioral patterns and 
should work to undermine them when they exist. One way to do this is to grant a kind of political 
priority to supporting historically marginalized people’s exertions of influence over historically 
empowered people. I don’t mean we should support all foreign influence exerted by the 
historically marginalized, regardless of the specific form it takes. It should still meet the ethical 
standards we’ve developed here and should actually promote justice in recipient societies. But 
assuming there will be multiple cases of foreign influence that meet these requirements, we, as 
participants in global politics, should prioritize supporting those in that set exerted by historically 
marginalized people. Given two comparable cases of justified foreign influence—one led by 
historically marginalized people and one not—and faced with the choice of how to allocate 
scarce political resources, we should allocate them to support the former. Another way for 
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foreign influencers to combat neo-colonial behavioral patterns is to actively work to undermine 
them. Thus, if an act of foreign influence does contribute to an existing neo-colonial behavioral 
pattern, influencers should take steps to subvert that pattern. 
Prioritizing support for historically marginalized people’s influence and working to 
subvert neo-colonial behavioral patterns when they emerge will help ensure that, even if, in some 
cases, foreign influencers occupy a higher position in colonial hierarchies than recipients, the 
practice of foreign influence won’t merely be a vehicle for perpetuating those hierarchies. 
Moreover, prioritizing support for historically marginalized people’s influence will constitute 
another, distinct challenge (in addition to the influence itself) to any hierarchies and ideologies 
that are vestiges of colonialism. Clearly, the same goes for actions meant specifically to 
undermine neo-colonial behavioral patterns. Finally, prioritizing support for historically 
marginalized people’s influence and actively working to subvert neo-colonial behavioral patterns 
will arguably help build faith in the promise of foreign influence among historically 
marginalized people, who have often, understandably, been some of its harshest critics. These 
actions will lend credibility to the claim that foreign influence can serve the interests and protect 
the rights of all people, including—and perhaps especially—those who have been marginalized 
by the workings of global-politics-as-usual. This may, in turn, encourage historically 
marginalized people to participate in the practice of foreign influence, thereby helping give them 
a more substantial voice in global politics.  
Taking Stock 
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We’ve argued that some types of foreign influence escape the main moral objections 
against intervention, and this suggests there are morally responsible ways to promote justice 
abroad. Recognizing the problems that have often accompanied intervention, then, doesn’t 
necessitate abandoning justice-promotion-on-a-global-scale as a political goal. Foreign 
influencers can, if they follow the standards set out here, treat recipients with toleration, properly 
acknowledge the legitimacy of their existing institutions, and avoid perpetuating colonial 
hierarchies.  
To illustrate how we could use the standards developed here to evaluate a real case, let’s 
take a closer look at one of the cases discussed above—Tostan’s work in western Africa. I 
propose that Tostan meets the ethical standards developed here: its influence escapes all three 
objections to intervention and is therefore at least pro tanto permissible. Tostan’s influence 
escapes the toleration objection because it’s persuasive. It also escapes the legitimacy objection: 
Tostan treats recipient institutions as if they’re legitimate because its influence is extra-
institutional, non-forceful, and undertaken by a non-state actor (Tostan is an NGO).  
However, some may worry that Tostan perpetuates colonial hierarchies because it 
occupies a privileged position in these hierarchies compared to the recipients it works with. 
Though headquartered in Senegal, it is an international NGO with major offices in “white” 
Western countries (the US, Sweden, Canada, and Denmark), and was founded by an American 
woman (Tostan, n.d.(a)). Tostan’s work is thus an exertion of influence by these white Western 
countries—associated with groups historically empowered by colonialism—over people in 
Africa—who have historically been subordinated by colonialism.  
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Even so, I propose that Tostan doesn’t perpetuate colonial hierarchies and therefore 
escapes the neo-colonial objection. Recall, foreign influencers who occupy privileged positions 
in colonial hierarchies compared to the recipients of their influence don’t perpetuate colonial 
hierarchies if they treat recipients with toleration, treat recipient institutions as legitimate, and 
work to undermine any existing general pattern of foreign influence establishing those 
historically marginalized by colonialism as recipients and those historically empowered by it as 
influencers. We’ve already established that Tostan treats recipients with toleration and treats 
their institutions as legitimate. And I’ll argue below that Tostan also works to undermine neo-
colonial behavioral patterns.  
As an INGO, Tostan is especially well-placed to exercise a kind of political power 
Jennifer Rubenstein (2015: 71) calls “discursive power,” which is “the power to shape widely 
shared meanings.” Rubenstein (2015: 171-206) argues that INGOs’ portrayals of recipients as 
helpless victims of material deprivation (rather than political malfeasance), who are in need of 
foreign saviors, is a nefarious exercise of discursive power that can reinforce colonial hierarchies 
by lending credence to the ideas used to justify them (e.g., ideas of people in the Third World as 
helpless victims in need of saving, rather than autonomous agents subject to injustice and in need 
of empowerment). 
Thus, exercising discursive power to subvert these kinds of portrayals is one way to 
subvert colonial hierarchies and their associated behavioral patterns (see Rubenstein, 2015: 171-
206). And Tostan does seem to exercise discursive power in this subversive way. A brief review 
of its website reveals many images of African people and few images of “white saviors.” When 
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white people are pictured, they’re often presented as equals to the African people they 
accompany, rather than as heroes helping the desperately needy. The Africans pictured are often 
engaged in activities highlighting their intelligence and agency—attending classes, speaking to 
community groups, engaging in political demonstrations, and doing labor. Moreover, the text on 
Tostan’s website emphasizes community empowerment (rather than aiding helpless victims). Its 
mission statement reads, “We empower African communities to bring about sustainable 
development and positive social transformation based on respect for human rights” (Tostan, 
2014: 6). Thus, Tostan does exercise discursive power to challenge colonial hierarchies, the ideas 
that underlie them, and therefore the behavioral patterns that go along with them. Since it also 
treats recipients with toleration and treats recipients’ institutions as legitimate, we shouldn’t see 
Tostan’s work as perpetuating colonial hierarchies even though Tostan occupies a privileged 
position in these hierarchies with respect to the recipients it works with. Tostan’s work therefore 
escapes all three standard objections to intervention—from toleration, legitimacy, and neo-
colonialism—and is at least pro tanto morally permissible. 
Of course, global political actors should evaluate each (proposed) exercise of foreign 
influence individually. In the absence of in-depth case-specific analysis, though, the ethical 
standards developed here argue in favor of two presumptions that both would-be foreign 
influencers and those deciding whether to support or oppose a given exercise of foreign influence 
should adopt.  
Namely, we should adopt a presumption in favor of less-controlling forms of foreign 
influence, and one in favor of what I’ll call counter-hegemonic influence—which happens when 
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influencers are currently and historically less geopolitically powerful than recipients. As we’ve 
seen, less controlling influence is less likely than its more-controlling counterparts to involve 
intolerance or the denial of recipient institutions’ legitimacy. Since treating recipients with 
toleration and treating their institutions as legitimate reduces the likelihood that foreign 
influencers will perpetuate colonial hierarchies, adopting a presumption in favor of less 
controlling influence would also help safeguard against this danger. Similarly, we’ve seen that 
foreign influencers who weren’t historically and aren’t currently more geopolitically powerful 
than recipients are comparatively unlikely to deny recipient institutions’ legitimacy or perpetuate 
colonial hierarchies. Exertions of foreign influence where influencers are actually less 
geopolitically powerful, or historically under-privileged with respect to recipients have an 
additional benefit: not only do they not perpetuate problematic geopolitical and colonial 
hierarchies; they directly challenge them.  
Thus, we should adopt presumptions in favor of less controlling and counter-hegemonic 
foreign influence. When deciding which of several comparable exertions of foreign influence to 
engage in or support, we should prioritize the less controlling and counter-hegemonic ones. 
Adopting these presumptions is a task of immediate practical import. Global political actors need 
not wait, for example, for the establishment of strong and stable global political institutions or a 
cohesive global political identity; we can (and should) begin to act on the presumptions I’ve 
recommended here and now.  
Conclusions 
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This article has begun to develop an ethics of foreign influence well-suited to a global 
politics in which state and non-state actors routinely trade influence using many different means. 
We’ve shown there are pro tanto permissible ways to pursue justice via foreign influence 
without falling prey to the standard objections against intervention. And we’ve reached this 
conclusion without abandoning the values underlying the standard objections (toleration, 
legitimacy, and anti-colonialism). Some might defend foreign influence by arguing these values 
are unimportant compared to the justice foreign influence could bring about. But we’ve shown 
some types of foreign influence are pro tanto permissible even granting these values’ paramount 
importance—and even in cases where the objections they ground have the most moral force 
(when foreign influence isn’t needed to avert especially grave injustices, but instead tries to 
redress “ordinary” injustice). This is because not all exertions of foreign influence treat recipients 
with intolerance, deny their institutions’ legitimacy, or perpetuate colonial hierarchies. 
And in a world as interconnected as ours, with as many opportunities for foreign 
influence, it’s reasonable to expect that any given political actor will frequently find itself 
capable of exerting some permissible kind of foreign influence. Even as individuals, we can 
donate to international NGOs, participate in transnational social movements, or join international 
boycotts. Thus, there are generally permissible ways to engage in political contestation aimed at 
achieving justice abroad. This is not only true in exceptional circumstances. It is true as a matter 
of course, in everyday global politics. This, in turn, suggests we should think of global political 
contestation as we do of its domestic counterpart—a generally permissible avenue for promoting 
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justice. On this view, pursuing justice is not something only fellow citizens should do together; it 
is humanity’s collective project. 
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1 I treat actions publicly presented as attempts to promote justice by influencing foreign societies 
as examples of foreign influence, regardless of their architects’ true motives. 
2 Here, I follow Walzer’s (1980) lead, who distinguishes between “extreme” and “ordinary” 
oppression. 
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3 For information on the Army’s so-called “Edgewood project” and the CIA’s “MKUltra,” see 
Smith, 2019 and Rosenberg, 2018. For information on the CIA’s more recent study of “truth 
serum” as an interrogation tool, see Rosenberg, 2018. 
4 Both states and non-state actors can exercise foreign influence, but this sub-section will often 
identify the recipients of foreign influence as “states,” because I assume legitimacy is something 
possessed (or not) by states.  
5 I say “justifiable,” not “justified,” because these kinds of influence won’t be objectionable 
because they disregard recipient institutions’ legitimacy; but they could be objectionable for 
other reasons. 
6 For one account of the relationship between “intra-systemic” opposition to a state’s laws and 
that state’s legitimacy—albeit one meant to apply in the domestic context—see Pettit, 2012: 137-
8. 
7 I take it that organizations made up of states and who represent their state members in global 
politics (e.g., the IMF and WTO) can also deny states good standing in the international 
community, but only because, when they act, they act as proxies for their state members. 
